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CASE SUMMARY 
 
UNITED STATES v. NOSAL: 
SEPARATING VIOLATIONS OF 
 EMPLOYERS’ COMPUTER-USE  
POLICIES FROM CRIMINAL  
COMPUTER HACKING INVASIONS 
COLETTE THOMASON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Computer crimes are a worldwide threat.1  Any individual with 
access to a computer may become victim to a computer crime.  In the 
summer of 2010, the Pentagon alone received over six million hacking 
and security threats per day, or 250,000 an hour.2  One of many 
measures to prevent computer crimes is the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA), a federal statute that prohibits the unauthorized access of a 
             * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; B.A., Business Administration, 2005, University of Hawaii at Hilo. 
 1 See University Professor Helps FBI Crack $70 Million Cybercrime Ring, ROCK CENTER 
WITH BRIAN WILLIAMS, (Mar. 21, 2012, 12:14 PM), www.rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/ 
2012/03/21/10792287-university-professor-helps-fbi-crack-70-million-cybercrime-ring (reporting 
that hackers from Eastern Europe allegedly stole $70 million from the payroll accounts of 
approximately 400 companies in America); see also Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Six 
Hackers in the United States and Abroad Charged for Crimes Affecting over One Million Victims, 
(Mar. 6, 2012), www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/six-hackers-in-the-united-states-and-
abroad-charged-for-crimes-affecting-over-one-million-victims (reporting that hackers were charged 
with theft of confidential information from approximately 860,000 subscribers of Stratfor, a private 
geopolitical analysis firm, and that hackers had claimed responsibility for halting service to websites 
for Visa, MasterCard, and Paypal in early 2011, in retaliation for the payment companies refusing to 
accept donations to Wikileaks). 
 2 Governments Battle To Stay Ahead of Threats on Internet, “The Great Leveler,” PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Aug. 10, 2010), www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/science/july-dec10/cybersec_08-10.html. 
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computer or computer data, such as when a hacker obtains bank account 
information from a financial institution’s network.3  There is currently 
disagreement among appellate courts as to the scope and application of 
the CFAA.4  Some circuits apply the CFAA only to hacking crimes, 
while others include violations of a webpage’s terms of service or an 
employer’s computer-use policy.5 
A violation of an employer’s computer-use policy could be as minor 
as checking a personal Facebook page or personal bank account while at 
work.  On the other hand, the violation of an employer’s computer-use 
policy could be more egregious, as in the case of United States v. Nosal.6  
In Nosal, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit examined the scope of the 
CFAA as applied to an employee who used a work computer for personal 
purposes, addressing the issue of whether a violation of an employer’s 
computer-use policy can be considered criminal hacking.7 
I. BACKGROUND 
The CFAA was enacted by Congress in 19848 and provides both 
criminal and civil penalties for unauthorized access to a computer.9  The 
CFAA prohibits intentional and unauthorized access to a computer that 
results in the accesser obtaining information from any protected 
computer.10  Under the CFAA, “protected computers” include those used 
exclusively for the use of financial institutions or the federal government, 
as well as those used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication.11 
 3 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (Westlaw 2012). 
 4 Peter A. Crusco, The “‘Privatization’ of Criminal Prosecution and the CFAA,” LAW 
TECHNOLOGY NEWS (June 20, 2012), www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp? 
id=1339937415222. 
 5 Id. 
 6 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 7 Id. at 856 (stating that hacking is “the circumvention of technological access barriers”).  
Because of its size, the Ninth Circuit ordinarily uses a limited en banc court, consisting of the Chief 
Judge of the circuit plus ten additional judges drawn by lot from the pool of active judges. Rarely, a 
case heard by a limited en banc court may be reheard by the full court. See 9th Cir. R. 35-3; see also 
28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (Westlaw 2012); Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (authorizing 
limited en banc courts for courts of appeals having more than fifteen active judges). Nosal was 
decided by a limited en banc court.  See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 855. 
 8 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858. 
 9 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (Westlaw 2012). 
 10 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A)-(C).  Besides information received from “any protected computer,” the 
CFAA also prohibits obtaining information in a financial record of a financial institution, 
information on a consumer in a consumer reporting agency’s file, and information from any 
department or agency of the federal government.  Id.  For simplicity, this Case Summary focuses on 
the prohibition relating to obtaining information from “any protected computer.” 
 11 Id. § 1030(e)(2). 
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The purpose of the CFAA is to prevent increasingly prevalent 
computer hacks.12  The CFAA punishes whoever “knowingly and with 
intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or 
exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the 
intended fraud and obtains anything of value.”13  Therefore, the CFAA 
may be violated in two ways: either by accessing a computer without any 
authorization, or by having authorization for limited access and 
exceeding that authorized access.14  The phrase “exceeds authorized 
access” is defined as “to access a computer with authorization and to use 
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the 
accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”15 
The CFAA has been used by prosecutors in a variety of cases 
relating to the unauthorized use of computer data.16  Unauthorized use 
commonly involves accessing a competitor’s or former employer’s 
database to obtain trade secrets, in order to cause damage to the 
competitor or former employer.17  Nosal involved a former employee 
who obtained his former employer’s confidential customer information 
from former colleagues still employed with the company.18  Other cases 
have involved charges under the CFAA pertaining to violations of 
websites’ terms of service agreements.19 
A CFAA violation was alleged in a well-known federal criminal 
case involving the suicide of a teenage girl who was harassed on a social 
networking site by a classmate’s mother.20  Lori Drew was charged with 
violating the CFAA after allegedly “cyberbullying” thirteen-year-old 
Megan Meier, her teenage daughter’s former friend.21  Drew created a 
 12 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858. 
 13 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4). 
 14 Id. § 1030(a)(4); see Nosal, 676 F.3d at 864 (Silverman, J., dissenting). 
 15 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(6). 
 16 See JONATHAN D. AVILA ET AL., PRIVACY COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA 
§ 4.21 (2008). 
 17 See id. 
 18 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
 19 See supra note 16. 
 20 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  Not all allegations in the 
indictment were established at trial. 
 21 Id. at 452.  Lori Drew was charged with violating the portion of the CFAA that prohibits 
“accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization and obtaining information 
from a protected computer where the conduct involves an interstate or foreign communication and 
the offense is committed in furtherance of a crime or tortious act.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(2)(C), (c)(2)(B)(ii)).  For example, Lori Drew used a photograph of a boy as the fictitious 
account’s profile photo without the boy’s consent, in violation of MySpace’s terms of service.  See 
id. at 452. 
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fictitious profile on the website www.MySpace.com (“MySpace”),22 
posing as a sixteen-year-old boy, and used the page to contact Meier.23  
The prosecution described the contact as “flirtatious.”24  After 
approximately a month of flirtatious contact, the fictitious “boy” 
reportedly sent Meier a message that he no longer liked her and that “the 
world would be a better place without her in it.”25  Megan Meier 
committed suicide that same day.26  A jury convicted Lori Drew of a 
misdemeanor violation of the CFAA because she intentionally breached 
MySpace’s terms of service.27  The jury’s guilty verdict was 
subsequently vacated by the federal district court.28  The district court 
found that the conviction violated the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
because users of MySpace were not on notice that a breach of the 
website’s terms of service could be a crime.29 
A CFAA violation can also be alleged as a civil cause of action.30  
For example, an employer initiated litigation against a former employee 
who installed damaging software on a company computer.31  The 
employee decided to leave the company and start his own competing 
business and installed the software before returning the computer back to 
the company.32  The software destroyed data on the employer’s computer 
 22 Id. at 453.  In Drew, a vice president of MySpace described MySpace as “a ‘social 
networking’ website where members can create ‘profiles’ and interact with other members.”  Id.  
MySpace accounts are free of charge, but members must be of a certain age, must provide personal 
information, such as their name and email address, and must agree to MySpace’s terms of service 
and privacy policy.  Id.  It is not required that an individual read or even access the terms of service 
and privacy policy; all that is needed is a click on the “check box” stating that the individual agrees 
to the terms of service and privacy policy.  Id. 
 23 Id. at 452. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 451. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See id. at 463 (explaining that “the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal 
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement”) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)).  As for the breach of a 
website’s terms of service, the CFAA does not explicitly treat such a breach as a criminal act, and, as 
such, there were no clear guidelines for legal enforcement.  See id. at 466-67.  In the absence of clear 
guidelines as to when the intentional violation of a website’s terms of service could lead to criminal 
penalties, the CFAA would be overbroad.  Id.  An extremely high number of Internet users could be 
turned into criminals, including not only those who create false MySpace accounts, but those who, 
for example, lie about their appearance or advertise the sale of girl scout cookies on MySpace.  See 
id. at 466. 
 30 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (Westlaw 2012). 
 31 Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 32 Id. at 419. 
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and permanently erased company information.33  The Seventh Circuit 
held that the installation could violate the CFAA, and remanded the case 
for a determination by the trial court.34 
In a similar instance, the First Circuit heard a case that involved a 
tour company that sued a competitor, alleging a CFAA violation.35  
Several employees of the competitor were former employees of the tour 
company.36  The competitor used a software program that could access 
the tour company’s prices from the company’s website.37  The defendant 
competitor created the software program based on its employees’ 
knowledge of the tour company’s proprietary codes.38  The competitor 
then used the pricing information to undercut the tour company’s 
prices.39  The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s grant of an 
injunction, based on the CFAA, that barred the competitor from using the 
software program.40 
A. FACTS OF UNITED STATES V. NOSAL 
Defendant David Nosal was a former employee of Korn/Ferry 
International, a firm that provided services from executive recruitment to 
talent consulting and leadership development.41  After Nosal left the 
company, he contacted several former coworkers who were still 
employed at Korn/Ferry and persuaded them to release confidential 
information to him.42  Nosal planned to use the information to create his 
own competing business.43  The information he obtained from his former 
co-workers included source lists, names and contact information for 
Korn/Ferry clients.44 
Korn/Ferry’s computer-use policy authorized employees to access 
such information, but employees were not authorized to release 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 420.  Since the appeal stemmed from the dismissal of the employer’s suit, the court 
of appeals was not in a position to affirm a finding of a CFAA violation, but instead reinstated the 
case.  Id. 
 35 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 36 Id. at 579. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 580. 
 39 Id. at 579. 
 40 Id. at 585. 
 41 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see About Us, 
KORN/FERRY INT’L, www.kornferry.com/AboutUs (last visited Sept. 24, 2012). 
 42 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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confidential information outside of the firm.45  Nosal was subsequently 
charged by the government, in part for aiding and abetting his former co-
workers in “exceed[ing their] authorized access” in violation of the 
CFAA.46 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. NOSAL 
The government charged David Nosal with numerous counts of 
trade secret theft, mail fraud, conspiracy, and criminal CFAA violations 
for computer invasion.47  Several of the CFAA violations were related to 
aiding and abetting Korn/Ferry employees.48  Nosal filed a motion to 
dismiss the CFAA indictments on the theory that misuse of information 
by employees with authorized access to the information was not 
proscribed by the CFAA.49  Nosal argued that the CFAA was instead 
meant to prevent hackers from illegally accessing information, and did 
not apply to employees who misappropriate information.50 
The district court denied Nosal’s motion to dismiss the CFAA 
counts.51  According to the district court, the Korn/Ferry employees used 
the information for a fraudulent purpose, which was equivalent to 
unauthorized access of information in violation of the CFAA.52  At the 
point an employee has the “intent to defraud,” the employee is no longer 
authorized to access corporate information.53  Therefore, the court 
reasoned, the employee accesses the information “without authorization” 
or “exceeds [his or her] authorized access.”54 
Shortly after the district court’s rejection of Nosal’s motion to 
dismiss the CFAA counts, the Ninth Circuit decided a similar case that 
dealt with the CFAA.55  The case was LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 
wherein the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed the CFAA’s phrases 
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.”56  The 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
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outcome of Brekka caused Nosal to file a motion for reconsideration and 
a second motion to di 57
The district court followed the analysis in Brekka and dismissed 
most of the CFAA charges “for failure to state an offense.”58  The 
government appealed the dismissal of these CFAA charges.59  The Court 
of Appeals originally reversed and remanded the district court’s 
decision,60 but later granted rehearing en banc.61  This Case Summary 
discusses the en banc decision. 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS 
A. APPLICATION OF THE CFAA’S TERMS “WITHOUT 
AUTHORIZATION” AND “EXCEEDS AUTHORIZED ACCESS” 
The Ninth Circuit explained that the CFAA was enacted to address 
the issue of computer hacking.62  The phrase in the CFAA “without 
authorization” expressly prohibits access to an unauthorized computer.63  
The phrase “exceeds authorized access” is commonly applicable in the 
employment context when an employee has access to a corporate 
computer system but ventures outside the scope of his or her authorized 
access.64 
The government agreed that the phrase “without authorization” 
prohibits hackers or outsiders from unauthorized access to computers.65  
However, the government disagreed with the district court’s 
interpretation of “exceeds authorized access.”66  The government argued 
that the CFAA’s phrase “exceeds authorized access” applies to persons 
who are authorized to use a certain computer, but who exceed that 
 57 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
 58 Id. (referring to the district court’s opinion that “[t]here is simply no way to read [the 
definition of ‘exceeds authorized access’] to incorporate corporate policies governing use of 
information unless the word alter is interpreted to mean misappropriate”) (quoting United States v. 
Nosal, No. C 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010)). 
 59 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856 (noting that the district court dismissed five CFAA counts, which 
were the only counts before the appellate court). 
 60 United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 61 United States v. Nosal, 661 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 62 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856-57. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 856 (“The CFAA defines ‘exceeds authorized access’ as ‘to access a computer with 
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser 
is not entitled so to obtain or alter.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)). 
 65 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858. 
 66 Id. at 856-58. 
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authorized use.67  In contrast, Nosal argued that “exceeds authorized 
access” does not apply to the use of the information in the computer, but 
strictly to access to that information.68  According to Nosal’s argument, 
an employee who has authorization to access a computer is not in 
violation of the CFAA simply because he or she misuses the information 
to which he or she had authorized access.69 
The court rejected the government’s argument on the basis of the 
language in the CFAA: “information . . . the accesser is not entitled so to 
obtain or alter.”70  According to the court, “entitled” is synonymous with 
“authorized.”71  The government argued that “entitled” means to be 
given a right, such that the Korn/Ferry employees exceeded their 
authorized access when they violated the rights given to them by the 
company’s use policy.72  The government further argued that the word 
“so” in this phrase is synonymous with “in that matter,” which must refer 
to use restrictions.73  The court rejected both arguments, declining to 
adopt the government’s proposed broader interpretation.74  The court 
explained that the word “so” is used as a conjunction and should not be 
given a substantive meaning without Congress’s express intent to expand 
the scope of the CFAA by use of the word “so. 75
According to the court, the government’s proposed broad 
interpretation would result in the CFAA becoming “an expansive 
misappropriation statute” instead of the “anti-hacking statute” that it is.76  
The court thus favored Nosal’s narrower interpretation of the CFAA—
the phrase “without authorization” applies to outside hackers who have 
no authorized access to a computer, and “exceeds authorized access” 
applies to inside hackers who have authorized access but exceed the 
scope by accessing unauthorized files or data.77 
 67 Id. at 856-57. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 857 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(6), which provides that “the term ‘exceeds 
authorized access’ means to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or 
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 71 Id. at 857. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 857-58. 
 76 Id. at 857. 
 77 Id. at 858. 
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B. CFAA INTERPRETATION PURSUANT TO THE RULE OF 
LENITY 
In addressing the government’s proposed meaning of the CFAA’s 
language, the Ninth Circuit explained the concept of strict construction.78  
Strict construction is encompassed in the “rule of lenity,”79 which 
requires that criminal laws be subject to a strict reading.80  Therefore, 
when two possible readings of a criminal statute are plausible, it is 
necessary to select the narrower reading, unless Congress has 
unambiguously prescribed the harsher alternative.81 
The rule of lenity helps guarantee that citizens will have notice of 
criminal laws and their accompanying penalties.82  The Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that, should a broader interpretation of the CFAA apply, a 
large number of citizens would be subject to criminal penalties for the 
slightest violation of a terms of service agreement or corporate computer-
use policy.83  This could occur because it is not uncommon for an 
individual to exceed his or her authorized access to a computer.84  For 
example, a member of a dating site may lie about their age when, as part 
of the dating site’s policy, the member would have agreed to refrain from 
posting false information.  If a strict interpretation of the CFAA were 
applied, the member could be charged with a CFAA violation. 
If the court had accepted the government’s proposed broad 
interpretation under the CFAA, employees who use company computers 
to check personal email, surf the Internet for personal reasons, or shop 
for personal goods could be subjected to criminal charges for a federal 
offense.85  This could lead to FBI involvement and criminal penalties for 
even minor violations of corporate computer-use policies.86  Such a 
broad interpretation would encompass a much larger spectrum of 
violations than Congress intended.87  Consequently, the court determined 
the language of the CFAA was not meant to include mere violations of a 
corporation’s computer-use policy.88  Rather, the CFAA’s purpose is to 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 863. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 860. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
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prevent hackers from accessing computers that they have no 
authorization to access.89 
The Ninth Circuit selected a narrower interpretation that prevents a 
flood of convictions and litigations for mere “unauthorized” use of 
computers,90 holding that “exceeds authorized access” prohibits gaining 
unauthorized access to information, not the unauthorized use of that 
information.91 
Moreover, criminal activities and the accompanying punishment 
must be clearly stated by Congress.92  If, as is the case with the provision 
involved in Nosal, there is doubt concerning congressional intent, a court 
“must choose the interpretation least likely to impose penalties 
unintended by Congress.”93 
The Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the CFAA’s language 
“exceeds authorized access” prevented the government from having a 
successful argument.94  The determination resulted from the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis of access restrictions versus use restrictions.95  The 
“exceeds authorized access” language applies to access of information, 
not to use of information.96  Therefore, the CFAA remains a prohibition 
that targets hackers who unlawfully gain access to computers, instead of 
a prohibition against misuse of information obtained through authorized 
access to a computer.97  Consequently, the Korn/Ferry employees and 
Nosal were not subject to the CFAA’s criminal sanctions.98 
C. COMPUTER USERS SHOULD NOT FACE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
FOR VIOLATING COMPUTER-USE POLICIES 
The Ninth Circuit provided further support for a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA by illustrating the potential consequences of a 
broader interpretation.99  The court acknowledged that employees might 
frequently violate their employers’ computer-use policies, whether by 
“g-chatting with friends, playing games, shopping or watching sports 
 89 Id. at 858. 
 90 Id. at 863. 
 91 Id. at 864. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 863 (quoting United States v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 94 Id. at 864. 
 95 Id. at 863-64. 
 96 Id. at 864. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 860-63. 
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highlights.”100  These violations, or “minor dalliances,” could be 
considered federal crimes under a broad CFAA interpretation.101  
Employees who violate the CFAA under the government’s broad 
interpretation could be threatened with criminal prosecution.102  
Employers may take advantage of this and enforce the CFAA at their 
whim, both subjectively and inconsistently.103 
Further, the government’s broad interpretation of the CFAA would 
result in uncertainty as to what constitutes criminal behavior.104  
Employees, who rarely read or understand their employers’ computer-
use policies, would not have sufficient notice of the criminal penalties 
they could be subject to for violating the use policies.105  The court used 
the examples of not knowing whether using a company computer to 
check the weather for a business trip or to check on a company softball 
game would amount to a violation of the CFAA.106  An employee may 
email a friend or relative instead of calling from the company phone.107  
Under the government’s broad interpretation of the CFAA, the use of the 
computer, rather than the phone, would result in criminal liability.108 
A broad interpretation of the CFAA would be problematic not only 
in the employment context, but also for the public’s use of computers.109  
Internet use is often “governed by a series of private agreements and 
policies that most people are only dimly aware of and virtually no one 
reads or understands.”110  These private agreements are found on popular 
Internet sites such as Facebook, Amazon, IMDb, and YouTube.111  The 
Ninth Circuit provided the example of Google’s terms of service, which 
forbid use of Google’s services by those who are not old enough to 
“form a binding contract with Google.”112  Another example provided by 
 100 Id. at 860. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 860 n.7 (noting that an employer is able to fire an employee for certain computer-use 
violations that are severe enough to justify termination, such as when an employee spends “six hours 
tending his FarmVille stable on his work computer”).  Firing an employee is different from 
enforcing criminal penalties against the employee or having him or her arrested.  Id. 
 104 Id. at 860. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 860-61. 
 110 Id. at 861. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. (citing Google’s terms of service, effective Apr. 16, 2007-Mar. 1, 2012 § 2.3, 
www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/archive/20070416 (“You may not use the Services and may 
not accept the Terms if . . . you are not of legal age to form a binding contract with Google . . . .”)). 
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the court is Facebook’s terms of service that forbid allowing another 
person to log into a member’s account.113  Other examples are posting 
inaccurate information about oneself on eHarmony114 and posting an 
eBay ad in the wrong category.115 
According to the court, under the government’s proposed broad 
interpretation of the CFAA, describing yourself on eHarmony as “‘tall, 
dark and handsome,’ when you’re actually short and homely, will earn 
you a handsome orange jumpsuit.”116  Not only are a website’s terms of 
service often difficult to find and understand, but most websites reserve 
the right to revise their terms of service at any time.117  It is unreasonable 
to believe Internet users will read a website’s terms of service every time 
they access a particular website.118  Internet users, in droves, could 
potentially be criminally liable for violations of various websites’ terms 
of service if the government were allowed a broad interpretation of the 
CFAA.119  Therefore, the court held, the CFAA’s reference to “exceeds 
authorized access” does not apply to a violation of a company’s 
computer-use policy.120 
D. THE DISSENT: KNOWLEDGE AND INTENTIONAL FRAUD 
SHOULD BE WEIGHED HEAVILY WHEN APPLYING THE 
CFAA 
Judge Silverman wrote a dissent in which Judge Tallman joined.121  
The dissent focused on the facts specific to the case, the alleged 
“valuable proprietary information” that Nosal stole from Korn/Ferry, 
rather than “playing Sudoku, checking email, fibbing on dating sites, or 
any of the other activities that the majority rightly values.”122  Nosal’s 
conviction stemmed from his, and his former colleagues’, intentional 
 113 Id. at 861 (citing Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities § 4.8 
www.facebook.com/legal/terms (“You will not share your password . . . [,] let anyone else access 
your account, or do anything else that might jeopardize the security of your account.”)). 
 114 Id. at 861 (citing eHarmony terms of service § 2(i), www.eharmony.com/about/terms 
(“You will not provide inaccurate, misleading or false information to eHarmony or to any other 
user.”)). 
 115 Id. at 861-62 (citing eBay user agreement, www.pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html (“While using eBay sites, services and tools, you will not: post content or items in 
an inappropriate category or areas on our sites and services . . . .”)). 
 116 Id. at 860. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 864. 
 122 Id. 
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misuse of the company’s confidential information and knowledge that 
such use violated the company’s policy.123  According to the dissent, the 
presence of fraud and knowledge set this case apart from the “far-fetched 
hypotheticals” offered by the majority.124 
The dissent agreed with a recent Ninth Circuit case that interpreted 
“exceeds authorized access” as going beyond the limits of an individual’s 
limited allowed use of a computer.125  If an employee has access to a 
computer, but lacks access to certain files on the computer, then the 
employee would exceed his or her authorized access by accessing the 
restricted files.126  As an example of this concept, the dissent explained 
that a consumer may test-drive a car a short distance, but driving the car 
to Mexico “on a drug run” would exceed the consumer’s authority.127  
This interpretation allows the CFAA to cover both types of theft: the 
complete “unauthorized access” and the “exceed[ed] authorized 
access.”128 
The dissent’s analysis falls in line with cases from the Third, Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits which have held that the CFAA’s phrase “exceeds 
authorized access” pertains to “employees who knowingly violate clear 
company computer restrictions agreements.”129  For example, the Fifth 
Circuit case involved an employee who violated her employer’s 
computer-use policy by accessing confidential customer information in 
order to commit fraud.130  The Eleventh Circuit held that a Social 
Security Administration employee who accessed personal information 
about former and potential girlfriends exceeded his authorized access.131  
Similarly, the Third Circuit upheld a CFAA conviction of a government 
contractor’s employee who accessed confidential company information 
to obtain President Obama’s student loan records.132  The presence of 
knowledge and intentional fraud justified CFAA convictions in those 
cases.133  In the dissenters’ view, Nosal’s knowledge and intent to 
defraud his employer by obtaining confidential information in violation 
of the employer’s policy fell squarely within the phrase “exceeds 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 864-65 (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 
2009)). 
 126 Id. at 865. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 865-66. 
 130 Id. at 864 (citing United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271-73 (5th Cir. 2010)). 
 131 Id. at 864 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
 132 Id. at 861 (citing United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 133 Id. at 866-67. 
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authorized access” in the CFAA.134  Therefore, the dissent would have 
reversed the dismissal of the CFAA charges.135 
CONCLUSION 
In Nosal, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the CFAA strictly and 
narrowly, limiting the scope of the CFAA’s phrase “exceeds authorized 
access.”136  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit ensured that employers would 
not be able to seek harsh criminal penalties for minor breaches of 
company computer-use policies.137  At the same time, employers have 
other remedies available to enforce their computer policies, such as state 
criminal and civil actions.  A broad interpretation of the CFAA could 
affect “millions of ordinary citizens,” who might become subject to 
criminal punishment for a range of common activities.138  Other circuits 
have chosen a broader interpretation of the CFAA that covers company 
computer-use policy violations or violations of a duty to loyalty.139  In 
Nosal, the Ninth Circuit took the opportunity to urge the other circuits to 
reconsider their interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” in the 
CFAA.140  The Ninth Circuit has laid a bright-line boundary as to what 
the CFAA does and does not cover.141  In so doing, Nosal has created a 
split among the circuits that have considered the issue142 and has invited 
speculation as to whether the Supreme Court will resolve the split.143 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(6) (Westlaw 2012). 
 137 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863-64. 
 138 Id. at 862-63. 
 139 Id. at 862. 
 140 Id. at 863. 
 141 Id. at 854. 
 142 Id. at 863. 
 143 See Richard Santalesa, Ninth Circuit Narrows Reach of CFAA in En Banc US v. Nosal 
Decision, INFO. LAW GRP. (Apr. 13, 2012), www.infolawgroup.com/2012/04/articles/computer-
fraud-and-abuse-act-c/ninth-circuit-narrows-reach-of-cfaa-in-en-banc-us-v-nosal-decision. 
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